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Introduction
Urban economists have long proposed that three sources of external scale economies explain the bene…ts of industry agglomeration, which are external to the …rm, but internal to an industry concentrated in a particular region [Marshall (1890) ]. The …rst is the potential for more extensive interaction between suppliers and buyers, allowing for vertical disintegration and supplier specialization that leads to higher productivity within the area. The second is a …rm's ability to capture industryspeci…c knowledge and information spillovers resulting from the close proximity of similar …rms and other economic agents. The third is labor market pooling, where agglomeration improves each …rm's productivity because it increases the quantity of available labor skills and the quality of the …rm-worker matching process. Alfred Marshall's concept of external scale economies underlies much theoretical work, including contributions to our understanding of long-run economic growth, international trade, and economic geography [for example, Rivera-Batiz (1988) , Krugman (1991) , Venables (1996) , Rodríguez-Clare (1996) and Hanson (1996) ]. Echoing Marshall (1890) , the theoretical literature emphasizes increasing returns for …rms stemming from some form of industry-speci…c external economies.
As for the empirical research, Rosenthal & Strange (2004) and Puga (2010) note that the majority of the evidence for the existence and extent of external economies is indirect and comes from studies showing excessive localization-spatial concentration over and above what would be expected-for a wide range of industries. Work along this line includes Ellison & Glaeser (1997) , Maurel & Sedillot (1999) , Devereux et al. (2004) , Duranton & Overman (2005) and Guimarães et al. (2007) . More direct evidence has been obtained in studies comparing wages across areas [Wheaton & Lewis (2002) , Combes et al. (2008) , Freedman (2008) and Mion & Naticchioni (2009)] . The 1 idea is that higher wages in clusters re ‡ect higher …rm productivity resulting from industry-speci…c external economies. Indeed, these higher wages would lead …rms to relocate elsewhere unless there were some signi…cant compensating productivity advantages in areas where industries agglomerate [Glaeser & Maré (2001) ]. 1 Relying on wage data to uncover evidence for industry-speci…c external scale economies raises some considerable challenges. A …rst problem is that observed and non-observed abilities of workers may vary across areas. If better workers sort into clusters, then the wage premium may indicate workers' greater abilities, not any intrinsic externalities from clustering [Glaeser & Maré (2001) ; Combes et al. (2008) ]. Likewise, observed and non-observed qualities of …rms might di¤er across regions. Better …rms may also sort into clusters, leading to higher mean wages in these areas [Mion & Naticchioni (2009)] . Thus, applied work using wage regressions should control for the possibility of spatial sorting of …rms and workers. In turn, this approach requires matched employer-employee micro-level data.
Wage di¤erences across areas can also be caused by local non-human endowments that boost …rms'productivity and the marginal product of workers. Firms in some areas may exhibit higher productivity because of the natural features of a favorable location, such as a climate suited to a particular kind of economic activity or the presence of natural resources in the area [Ellison & Glaeser (1999) and Kim (1999) ].
The built environment and human endowments, such as public infrastructure or local institutions and technology, may also matter. If these forces are at work, then larger 1 Glaeser (1999) and Glaeser & Maré (2001) used wage regressions to look for evidence on urban (not industry-speci…c) external economies. They advanced the idea that the skills of …rms and workers evolve more positively over time in urban areas, the so-called "learning hypothesis." A more direct approach to gauge the importance of external economies (urban or industry-speci…c) relied on productivity measures [e.g. Ciccone & Hall (1996) , Ciccone (2002) and Henderson (2003) ].
2 mean wages in clusters may not indicate the presence of industry-speci…c external scale economies. In addition, we should be aware that although empirical evidence on a wage premium may support the existence of productivity gains associated with external economies, the lack of evidence on such premium does not mean these economies are absent. Roback (1982) showed that the presence of local endowments, like natural or consumption amenities, will make workers more willing to accept lower wages. Thus, these localized amenities can o¤set the positive impact of industryspeci…c external economies, rendering the net e¤ect on wages ambiguous.
In applied studies researchers must also take into account the possibility that the wage premium in clusters can be related to productivity gains associated with urban external economies [Jacobs (1969) ]. These are economic bene…ts that accrue from the agglomeration of general economic activity, not from the spatial concentration of a particular industry.
Another empirical problem is disentangling the three sources of external economies originally proposed by Marshall (1890) . The di¢ culty arises because all the three sources-vertical disintegration, knowledge spillovers, and better quality of the …rm-worker matching process-share the prediction that productivity increases with the scale of an industry at a location, allowing …rms to pay higher wages. This "observational equivalence" [Rosenthal & Strange (2004) ] makes it complicated to distinguish the three main causes of industry-speci…c external economies using wage regressions.
Thus, higher wages in industrial clusters, after controlling for the spatial sorting of both …rms and workers, local human and non-human endowments, and urban external economies, can be seen as evidence that either one, two, or all three sources of external economies proposed by Marshall (1890) are at work.
In this paper we use wage regression analysis to test the Marshallian hypothesis that industrial clustering improves the quality of the …rm-worker matching process. A major advantage is the availability of a large Portuguese panel data base, with linked employer-employee information. Our work is in line with Andersson et al. (2007) and Mion & Naticchioni (2009) , who also used wage regressions and micro-level data to examine the hypothesis that matching improves with agglomeration. Unlike us, however, these authors examined the relationship across urban agglomerations, not industrial clusters. Both studies computed match quality as the correlation between estimates of …rm quality and its mean worker quality for each area. They then related this correlation with a measure of urban agglomeration (employment density across areas). 2 The two papers present con ‡icting evidence. Andersson et al. (2007) found a positive relation between match quality and urban agglomeration using data for California and Florida, while Mion & Naticchioni (2009) uncovered a negative relationship relying on an Italian data set.
The main problem with these two studies has to do with their estimates of worker and …rm quality. Andersson et al.'s (2007) estimates are based on comprehensive data sets and on a wage regression that includes two high-dimensional …xed e¤ects (…rm and worker) following Abowd et al.'s (1999) model and econometric procedures. 3 On the other hand, the sampling procedure and relatively small size of Mion & Naticchioni's (2009) data base prevents them from using Abowd et al.'s (1999) speci…cation. Thus, their estimates of worker quality are based on a regression with a single …xed e¤ect for worker, while …rm quality is proxied by a measure of …rm size.
Recent work has convincingly argued that in the presence of unobserved worker, 2 Andersson et al. (2007) also analyzed the relationship between matching and urban agglomeration using a productivity approach. 3 See also Abowd, Lengermann & McKinney (2002) . The estimates of these individual …xed e¤ects are used to measure the quality of each worker and …rm.
4 …rm, and match heterogeneity, wage regressions that do not control for all these unobservables may su¤er from a considerable omitted variable bias [Woodcock (2007) and Woodcock (2008) ]. Thus, the estimates of individual quality of workers and …rms in Andersson et al. (2007) and Mion & Naticchioni (2009) may be plagued by this problem. As an alternative, Woodcock (2007) proposed the introduction of a worker…rm interaction term (the match-e¤ect) in Abowd et al.'s (1999) model.
So far, the only study that uses micro-level data to test the hypothesis that the quality of match improves with …rms' clustering within the same industry is Freedman (2008) . Looking at data for a single manufacturing sector of a U.S. state, the author …nds little evidence that the quality of matching increases with …rm's clustering. His inference, however, is based on an ad hoc comparison of results from a wage regression à la Abowd et al. (1999) with another one that, in line with Woodcock's (2007) suggestion, also controls for unobservable worker-…rm match e¤ects.
Our paper improves on the existing literature, notably Freedman's (2008) research, by establishing a precise econometric framework to test the relationship between industrial clustering and matching. Moreover, our results are obtained with a more comprehensive data set that includes all manufacturing sectors in the economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. We devote the next section to the discussion of our methodology. Then, in the third section we present the data and some descriptive statistics. Results are discussed in the fourth section, while section …ve concludes the paper.
2 Econometric Framework
Consider an augmented version of the traditional Mincerian wage equation for a single worker where we added a term to account for the impact of industry-speci…c external economies on wages. More formally, let
where w ijt is the wage of worker i, in …rm j, at time t. The x it is a vector of observable worker level characteristics (such as age, education, gender or tenure), while the z jt is a set of observable …rm level attributes (like its size, age or type of ownership). Other variables include a set of controls (dummies) for time-speci…c ( t ) and inter-industry (' s(j) ) wage di¤erentials. 4 Our variable of interest is L r(j)s(j)t , a measure that is introduced in the regression to pick-up a potential wage premium linked to industry-speci…c externalities. As argued in the introduction, a proper speci…cation should control for urbanization economies, as well as for regional human and non-human endowments that might a¤ect individual wages. Thus, we add to the wage equation in (1) two new variables. The variable r(j) in equation (2) 
Estimation of the above speci…cation may produce biased results. The problem is that non-observed abilities of workers and …rms may be correlated with the regressors. At the same time, as already noted, if these unobserved abilities are positively correlated with the L r(j)s(j)t , then higher wages in clusters may be a result of spatial sorting of workers and …rms based on unobservables, not industry-speci…c external economies. As proposed by Abowd et al. (1999) , with a large matched employeremployee panel data set it is possible to account for the non-observable characteristics of workers and …rms. This can be done by adding two …xed e¤ects, one speci…c to the worker and the other one speci…c to the …rm. In this case, our speci…cation becomes,
where we note that those variables that change only with j, r(j) and ' s(j) , are completely absorbed by the …rm …xed e¤ect. The introduction of these two …xed e¤ects will also assimilate all other time-invariant observable characteristics of workers and …rms that might a¤ect wages. With a high-dimensional data set, estimation of a linear regression model with two …xed e¤ects poses some computational challenges [see Abowd et al. (1999) ]. However, the exact least-square solution to this problem can be found using an algorithm proposed by Guimarães & Portugal (2010) .
As shown by Woodcock (2007) , results obtained with speci…cation (3) may be subject to substantial bias if unobservable …rm-worker match characteristics are important determinants of wages. Following Woodcock (2007), we introduce an additional term in the regression ( ij ) that accounts for the speci…c …rm-worker interaction.
This leads to a model with three …xed e¤ects accounting for unobservables. Thus, our speci…cation becomes:
Estimation of a model such as this poses some problems. As is, the model is overparameterized making it impossible to disentangle the three e¤ects. In this model a good match may be indistinguishable from a good worker working in a good …rm. In other words, without any restriction on the parameters, ij absorbs the e¤ect of i and j , meaning that a model such as
that includes a single …xed e¤ect for the interaction, ! ij , will capture the three e¤ects and provide the same …t as (4a), i.e., identical estimates for , , , and .
However, we have to keep in mind that our main interest is in the relation between ij and L r(j)s(j)t , after controlling for all other explanatory variables in equation (4a). That is, we are interested in the in the relation
One way to test for this relationship would be using a two-step procedure. In the …rst step we would obtain estimates of ij from (4a). Then, in a second step, these estimates would be regressed in the other explanatory variables. Although intuitive, this approach faces a di¢ culty. Because the model is overparameterized, to separate the three e¤ects it is necessary to impose restrictions on the parameters associated with the …xed e¤ects in order to obtain estimates of ij . Conceivably, there are many ways in which these restrictions can be imposed, and the estimates of ij will depend on the restriction. 5 An interesting result we obtained when studying this problem is that the results of a regression between the estimated ij and all other explanatory variables in (4a) will be invariant to the type of parameterization used for the …xed e¤ects (see Appendix A for a proof of this result). Thus, this two-step procedure is feasible without being a¤ected by the type of parameterization we will use.
In Appendix B, we also show that the coe¢ cients of a regression between the estimated ij and all other explanatory variables in equation (4a) can be obtained directly by comparing the estimated coe¢ cients of (3) and (4b). This result provides an alternative way to obtain our coe¢ cient of interest, the in equation (5). More speci…cally, to obtain this coe¢ cient we need only to subtract the estimated obtained in (4b) from that obtained in (3). To infer about the statistical signi…cance of the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients we can then make use of a test proposed by Gelbach identi…ers is also possible.
We constructed a panel of workers using data from 1995 through 2006. 7 We then restricted data to the manufacturing sector in the continental part of the Portuguese territory. Extensive checks on the consistency of the data were implemented following the methodology described in Cardoso & Portela (2009) . Next, we trimmed the top and bottom one percent of the wages in each year to avoid problems with outliers and retained only wage-earners working full-time. 8 To ensure comparability of the estimates of the …xed e¤ects, we restricted the data set to the largest connected group. 9 In our data, the largest connected group accounts for 95.8 percent of the observations.
Some basic descriptive statistics of our panel are shown in Table 1 where the highest number of worked hours is reported. 9 Estimates of the …xed e¤ects obtained for the regression model with two …xed-e¤ects are only comparable within the same group. Groups are de…ned as the set of observations comprising all the workers that ever belonged to any …rm in the group and all the …rms that employed any worker in the group. Identi…cation of the groups has been implemented using the algorithm in Abowd, Creecy & Kramarz (2002) .
and standard deviations calculated across all observations, the "Weighted Sample."
To furnish more meaningful statistics we also report these metrics calculated on the averages of time-values -the "Unweighted Sample" …gures in columns 4 and 5. As shown in column 4, the 1,005,886 workers in our sample have an average real hourly wage of 4.4 euros -using a 2009 de ‡ator. 10 Table 1 also shows statistics for the observable worker characteristics we will use in our regressions. School1 to School8 are dummy variables and Tenure is de…ned as the number of consecutive years in the same establishment.
In our regressions we included establishment …xed e¤ects. However, we control for …rm level observable characteristics such as size and type of ownership. Size is de…ned as the number of full-time workers in the …rm and there are three types of ownership (Private, Public and Foreign), according to the majority in the …rm's capital structure. These variables are relevant because the real hourly wage of workers may depend on the characteristics of the …rms to which establishments belong.
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[insert Table 1 about here]
Our variable of interest, Specialization, is computed at the concelho (county) level and using a three-digit breakdown of the Portuguese Standard Industrial Classi…ca-tion system (105 industries). 12 We calculated this variable using two alternative ways, 10 Wage is calculated as the sum of the base wage plus all other regularly paid components. To obtain hourly values, we divided by the number of normal working hours. Comparison of the …gures for the real hourly wage in columns 2 and 4 indicates that workers that remain more years in the panel are remunerated above those who stay for shorter periods of time. 11 Note, for example, that a worker in an establishment of a large …rm is likely to be paid more than another that works in an equally sized establishment of a smaller …rm. 12 The concelho is a Portuguese administrative region roughly equivalent to the U.S. county, but We overcame this problem by grouping together the a¤ected concelhos and ended up with 273 regions. Our panel only includes data for 272 of these regions because one was dropped for lack of observations.
Results
In Table 2 we show regression results using our preferred speci…cation -with Specialization measured as a count of establishments by industry and region. All nondummy variables are introduced in logs. In Columns (1) and (2), we present simple wage regressions that indicate a raw wage premium for clustering. Whether or not we adjust for the area of the regions, the elasticity of wages is around 0.01. Doubling the number of establishments in a region leads to an increase of wages in the same industry of about one percent. The last four columns follow the sequence of equations 1-4 presented in Section 2.
13 Column (3) shows the estimates for a traditional Mincerian equation, which includes observable characteristics of the worker and the …rm. Goodness of …t improves and the coe¢ cient on Specialization increases slightly. All other estimated coe¢ cients are in line with expectations. Wages are higher for males, older workers (peaking around the age of 58), and increase with tenure and education. There is also a wage premium for working in larger …rms, public companies, and especially foreign-owned …rms.
As argued before, a proper speci…cation should account for urbanization economies, as well as for regional endowments that might a¤ect productivity and individual earnings. Thus, in column (4), we add two new controls: A set of individual dummies for regions and the Urbanization variable. The dummies are intended to account for time-invariant characteristics of the regions (e.g. climate, amenities or natural resources). These variables also pick permanent interregional di¤erences in regional characteristics such as institutions, technology and infrastructures. The other vari-able, Urbanization, controls for urbanization economies and related time-varying attributes of the areas. It is interesting to note that the wage premium associated with the Urbanization variable is around three percent, in line with other studies [Ciccone & Hall (1996) , Ciccone (2002) , Combes et al. (2008) and Mion & Naticchioni (2009) ]. Even though we now rely on variation over time within industries to identify the relation, we still …nd an elasticity for Specialization in line with the previous regressions. Area is absorbed by the location dummies. These dummies also serve to mitigate a potential problem of endogeneity due to regional omitted variables that might be correlated with the other explanatory variables.
Another potential problem, as already discussed, is that non-observed abilities of workers and establishments may be correlated with the regressors. If these unobserved abilities are positively associated with Specialization, then higher wages in clusters may be a result of spatial sorting. Thus, as explained in Section 2, we introduce two sets of …xed e¤ects, one speci…c to the worker and the other to the establishment. This regression is found in column (5). 14 The coe¢ cient on Specialization drops to less than half its previous values, showing that sorting based on unobservables matters.
Finally, in column (6), following Woodcock (2007) , we introduce an establishmentworker speci…c …xed-e¤ect that accounts for match heterogeneity. As indicated in Section 2, if no restriction is imposed on the coe¢ cients, this match e¤ect absorbs the worker and establishment …xed e¤ects, rendering this a model with a single highdimensional …xed e¤ect. Note also that the estimates for the model in column (6) are equivalent to those that would be obtained in a speci…cation where the three …xed e¤ects (worker, establishment and interaction) were included with appropriate restrictions on the coe¢ cients.
[insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] We are interested in the relation between the establishment-worker match e¤ect and Specialization. The coe¢ cient of interest, the in equation (5) To check whether this result is statistically signi…cant, we implemented the test described in Gelbach (2009) . In a …rst step, we recovered the estimates of the ! ij using the model in equation (4b) (see also column (6) of Table 2 ) and decomposed the three e¤ects that are included in these estimates based on the assumption of orthogonality between the match e¤ect and the establishment and worker e¤ects.
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We then apply the second step regression shown in equation (5). Using this two-step procedure, we obtain the same 0.00018 for the (as expected) with an associated p-value of 3.1 percent. Hence, our estimate indicates little evidence that the quality of matching increases with establishment's clustering within the same industry. The size of the coe¢ cient is small and the p-value is not signi…cant at the one percent level. Similar evidence can be found using our alternative measure of Specialization based on employment (see Table 3 ). Here, the di¤erence in coe¢ cients is 0.00003 and the p-value associated with this di¤erence is 77.7 percent.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the Marshallian hypothesis that localization of an industry improves the …rm-worker matching process. To this end, we use a large Portuguese linked employer-employee data set and a novel approach that makes use of recent developments in the estimation and analysis of models with high-dimensional …xed e¤ects. Relying on micro-level wage regressions with controls for multiple sources of observed and non-observed heterogeneity, we …nd little evidence that the quality of matching increases with …rms'clustering within the same industry. This result extends on Freedman (2008) , who reached the same conclusion looking at data for a single manufacturing sector of an undisclosed U.S. state. Our result is obtained with a more comprehensive panel data set that includes all manufacturing sectors in the economy. Moreover, we improve on Freedman's (2008) approach by establishing a precise econometric framework to test the relationship between industrial clustering and matching. Indeed, Freedman's (2008) conclusions are based on an ad-hoc comparison of results from the two-…xed e¤ects model of Abowd et al. (1999) with another one that, in line with Woodcock's (2007) three …xed e¤ects model, also controls for unobservable worker-…rm match e¤ects.
Despite having not found much evidence on Marshall's suggestion that localization of an industry improves matching, our regressions in columns (6) of Tables 2 and served abilities of workers and …rms may evolve over time more positively in clusters and this source of variation is not captured by the three-…xed e¤ects model. and the alternative regression model
where we replaced 2 by its least-squares solution (b 2(Y:X 1 X 2 ) ) and rearranged the terms. Since 2 is replaced by its optimal value, the least squares solution obtained for 1 from (4) will be the same as that obtained from (B.1). This means that we can write
what constitutes the well known formula for omitted-variable bias and shows the equivalence between the coe¢ cients of the regressions. Recalling the regression model with two …xed e¤ects and interaction,
we can let Gelbach (2009) shows that the asymptotic t-tests of this regression can be interpreted as an extended version of a Hausman test. 
Specialisation ( 
